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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1970s, Congress dramatically overhauled the laws governing
the management of public lands, establishing the monitoring and conservation of natural resources as primary goals.' It was this fundament Univ. of Colorado School of Law (J.D., May 2006); Production Editor, Colorado
Law Review (2005-2006).
1. The National Forest Management Act of 1976 ("NFMA") and the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976 ("FLPMA") were enacted in 1976, setting revolutionary management goals for the governing agencies, expanding federal management
considerations to include wildlife, water, and environmental concerns. See National
Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1600 (2000) (requiring the National Forest Service to create a program for managing renewable resources coming from the national
forests); Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000) ("[I]t is
the policy of the United States that... the public lands be managed in a manner that
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tal change in management policy that formed the basis of the federal
"non-reserved" water right. 2 Simply stated, non-reserved rights are water rights asserted by the federal government or a federal agency that
do not have to be associated with the withdrawal or reservation of federal land, and that the federal government may assert irrespective of
state substantive or procedural water law.3 The federal non-reserved
water right would serve as a means of securing water for programs implemented under the new federal land management scheme.4 Avoiding the demands of state substantive water law simplifies the federal
government's implementation of federal programs involving public
lands. 5
As expected, many states were opposed to the federal non-reserved
right from its inception.6 It quickly became apparent that the nonreserved right was likely too controversial to be an effective means of
securing water, and the concept quietly vanished. Many commentators
assumed that the non-reserved right was inherently flawed and had
disappeared for good.7 However, in recent years non-reserved rights
have reemerged. Some commentators have again identified nonreserved rights as a viable means for federal government acquisition of
water rights for federal projects, arguing that Congress sanctioned the
will protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air
and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values.").
2. Most scholars recognize the 1979 Opinion issued by Department of the Interior
Solicitor Leo Krulitz as the basis of the non-reserved rights doctrine. See Federal Water
Rights of the National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Reclamation
and the Bureau of Land Management, 86 Interior Dec. 553, 574 (1979) [hereinafter
Krulitz Opinion]. See, e.g., John D. Leshy, Water Rights for New FederalLand Conservation
Programs:A Turn-of-the-Century Evaluation, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 271, 287 (2001);
Wendy Weiss, The Federal Government's Pursuit of Instream Flow Water Rights, 1 U. DENV.
WATERL. REv. 151, 171-72 (1998).
3. Krulitz Opinion, supranote 2, at 571, 574-75.
4. Id. at 614-16.
5. One reason the federal government would not want to follow the substance of
state water law is that western state appropriation systems do not recognize federallycreated instream flow rights. Many western states, including Colorado, do not permit
private individuals to hold instream flow rights. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3)
(2006) (granting the Colorado Water Conservation Board the exclusive authority to
make instream flow appropriations).
6. See Leshy, supra note 2, at 287; Frank J. Trelease, Uneasy Federalism--State Water
Laws and National Water Uses, 55 WAsii. L. REv. 751, 758 (1980) (discussing the opposition of the western states to the doctrine of non-reserved water rights).
7. See Michael C. Blumm, Unconventional Waters: The Quiet Revolution in Federal and
Tribal Minimum Streamfiows, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 445, 462 (1992) (recognizing that the
non-reserved right maintained a precarious position due to the Reagan Administration's hostility towards the concept); Sandra Dunn, Cooperative Federalism in the Acquisition of Water Rights: A FederalPractitioner'sPoint of View, 19 PAC. L.J. 1323, 1323-25 (1988)
(noting that the federal government had repudiated the concept of the non-reserved
right); Trelease, supra note 6, at 774 ("I think it very likely that the federal nonreserved right to appropriate instream flows on the public domain without regard to
state law will have a short life.").
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first non-reserved water right when it created the Great Sand Dunes
National Park and Preserve in Colorado.8 This article provides an
overview of the doctrine of federal non-reserved rights, discusses the
validity of the doctrine, and addresses the feasibility of asserting such
rights today.
Part I of this paper introduces the non-reserved right, defining it in
terms of the historical development of water law. Part II outlines the
general arguments for and against the existence of non-reserved rights.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a number of key officials in the federal government weighed in on the question of whether non-reserved
rights were valid as a matter of law. Part II analyzes the opinions released by those individuals and suggests that non-reserved rights are
valid under the U.S Constitution and under federal statutes. Part III
advances a number of additional justifications for recognizing nonreserved rights, and discusses the potential impact that federal nonreserved rights could have on the current water laws of the individual
states. Part LV introduces the Great Sand Dunes National Park and
Preserve Act as the first official statutory authorization of non-reserved
rights, and analyzes the specific language of the Act according to the
definitions and concepts laid out in Parts I through III. As a final
thought, this article discusses the future of the non-reserved right and
suggests that, because of the increasing strain on water resources in the
West, the federal non-reserved water right will become essential to securing water for future federal programs.
II. DEFINING NON-RESERVED RIGHTS
Because the non-reserved rights doctrine deals with the federal government's ability to claim and use the water found on public lands, it is
useful to summarize the history of the federal government's treatment
of water on public lands. This summary includes not only the federal
statutes addressing water on public lands, but also judicial decisions
interpreting and applying those statutes. Applying this foundation, it is
easier to fully define non-reserved rights and describe how they differ
from the closely-related federal "reserved" rights.
A. FEDERAL LAW AND WATER ON PUBLIC LANDS

The United States acquired much of the land west of the Mississippi River through the Louisiana Purchase, the Treaty of Guadalupe

8. See Leshy, supra note 2, at 285-87 (stating that legislation creating the Great
Sand Dunes National Park "did not conform to the traditional dichotomy between
state water rights and federal reserved water rights," but rather created "a new breed of
federal water right-a federal non-reserved right").

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 10

Hidalgo, and through transactions with various Indian tribes. 9 Upon
acquisition, Congress gained the power under the Constitution to dispose of the land and any resources thereon, including water, however
it saw fit.' ° Through the early part of the 1800s, the United States government largely ignored these newly acquired lands, and allowed pioneers, miners, and farmers to use this "public domain" freely." It was
only after the Civil War that Congress turned its attention to the public
domain, and that was primarily to approve of the development and
settlement that had already occurred thereon. 2 In 1866, Congress
passed an Act that formally recognized water rights secured under state
or local appropriation systems located on the public domain. 3 An
1870 amendment to that Act stated that all future mineral patentees
and homesteaders must also conform to the laws and requirements of
local governments and courts when appropriating water on the public
domain. 4 Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Desert Land Act of
1877, which opened up the public domain to purchase and provided
that "the right to use of water.. .shall depend upon bona fide prior appropriation.... "'5The Act further provided that "the water of all [nonnavigable] lakes, rivers, and other sources of water supply upon the
public lands.. .shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and
Today, these three acts remain valid law.
use of the public....
Although these acts do not explicitly sever water from the public
domain or confer the administration of water to the respective states,
the United States Supreme Court held that the acts implicitly facilitate

9.

See PAUL W.

GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIc LAND LAw DEVELOPMENT 75-85

(1968)

CHARLES F. WILKINSON,
CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 34 (1992)

(describing all major land acquisitions of the United States);

(describing land acquisitions made by the United States).
10. The Property Clause of the United States Constitution grants Congress the
power to "dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States..." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
11. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 146 (1855) (upholding the local system for mineral
and water disposition and acknowledging that "the free and unrestrained occupation
of the mineral region has been tacitly assented to by the [United States] government,
and heartily encouraged by the expressed legislative policy of the [California state
government]"); WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 40-41 (describing the spate of federal
legislation regarding mining on the public lands before 1850).
12. Professor Wilkinson describes the Mining Law of 1866, which validated former
trespassers' claims to land, as follows: "[T] he 1866 act may have been a federal statute,
but it was in large part an empty vessel to be filled by state law and local custom...."
WILKINSON, supra note 10, at 43. This statement embodies the common perception of

most of the early laws relating to the public lands-that federal law was simply a codification or approval of existing state systems.
13.

43 U.S.C. § 661 (2000).

14.

Id.

15.

Desert Land Acts, 43 U.S.C. § 321 (2000).

16.

Id.
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such a severance and conferral.' 7 The Court addressed the meanings
of the three acts-Act of 1866, Amendment of 1870, and the Desert
Land Act of 187 7-in California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., in which the Court held that the Act of 1866 and its 1870
amendment "approve and confirm the policy of appropriation for a
beneficial use, as recognized by local rules and customs, and the legislation and judicial decisions of the arid-land states, as the test and
measure of private rights in and to the non-navigable waters on the
public domain."' 8 The Court also held that after passage of the Desert
Land Act in 1877, "if not before, all non-navigable waters then a part of
the public domain became .

.

. subject to the plenary control of the

designated states...." " Thus, the Court recognized that Congress essentially severed nonnavigable waters from the public domain, allowing
the states to administer the appropriation of those waters, citing numerous other federal laws as verification of this severance. 20
To summarize, a combination of federal statutes and judicial decisions confirm that the laws of the various states govern the appropriation of water on public lands. However, this power to administer water
found on public lands is not absolute, as shown by the "reserved rights
doctrine." If the power granted to states to administer water on public
lands is indeed limited, how broad are those limitations? What power
has the federal government retained over water on public lands?
These questions lie at the heart of the non-reserved rights doctrine.
Before turning to the non-reserved right, it is important to introduce
the closely related "federal reserved water right" and discuss how federal reserved water rights limit state control over water on public lands.
B. FEDERAL RESERVED RIGHTS

Although the statutes and judicial decisions discussed above shifted
the administration of water rights to the states, the federal government
did not completely forfeit its power over the water on public lands.
This fact became evident in the 1899 United States Supreme Court
ruling in United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co. 2 ' The Court

identified two ways in which the federal government retained power
over water on public lands. First, the Court noted that a state "cannot
by its legislation destroy the right of the United States, as the owner of
17.

See Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 162

(1935).
18. Id. at 155.
19. Id. at 163-64.
20. Id. at 164 n.2 (identifying the Reclamation Act of 1902 and the Indian Appropriation Act of 1909 as two pieces of legislation that verify congressional recognition of
the supremacy of state law with respect to the acquisition of water located on public
lands).
21. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
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the lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters; so
far, at least, as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government property."" Second, the Court held that the federal government
maintained control over nonnavigable rivers to the extent that continued flow was necessary to preserve the navigability of downstream waterways.23 The first point, that the United States reserved a right to the
continued flow of water, was dicta as it was not essential to the holding
of the case. Less than ten years later, however, the Court reinforced
the idea that the federal government has a proprietary interest in waters flowing across federal lands.
In Winters v. United States, the Court held that the federal government implicitly "reserved" a quantity of unappropriated water when it
created the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in Montana. 4 The 1888
statute creating the Indian Reservation did not contain any provisions
explicitly reserving or appropriating water for the Reservation. 2' However, the Court reasoned that one of the main purposes of the Indian
Reservation was to facilitate agricultural production by the Indians liv26
ing thereon-a goal that would be impossible to meet without water.
Thus, the federal government impliedly reserved the amount of water
needed to fulfill the purpose of establishing tribal agriculture.2' This
practice of implied water rights reservation became known as the "reserved rights doctrine. 2, 8

The implied reservation of water carried a

priority date of the statute creating the Indian reservation.' Central to
the thesis of this article is the Court's confirmation that "[t] he power
of the government to reserve the waters and exempt them from appropriation under the state laws is not denied, and could not be.""0
Thus, the federal government has the power to impliedly reserve water
rights appurtenant to federal reservations of land.
Several cases arising after Winters have altered the scope of federal
reserved water rights. For many years, people assumed that the Winters
doctrine applied exclusively to Indian reservations. The United States
Supreme Court held otherwise in Arizona v. Calfornia,stating that the
doctrine of reserved rights applied to all federal reservations of land,

22.

Id. at 703.

23.

Id. (The Court ultimately decided the case on the federal government's right to

preserve the navigability of waterways).
24.

Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).

25.

Id. at 575-76.

26.

Id. at 575-77.

27. Id. at 577.
28. "[F]ederal reserved rights are a species of water right owned by the federal
government, created by the federal government to authorize and protect water uses by
the federal government on and in connection with federal reserved lands." Trelease,
supranote 6, at 756.
29. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.

30.

Id.
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including national parks, forests, and wildlife refuges.3 ' The Court reduced the impact of this ruling, however, when the Court later clarified that the reserved water rights are limited to the water needed to
fulfill the explicit purposes of such federal land reservations. 32 The
government can only accomplish the secondary purposes of federal
land reservations by acquiring water rights through state appropriation
systems.33 It is important to note that the federal reserved right is limited to primary purposes of federal land reservations. As will be discussed later in this paper, the non-reserved right makes a similar distinction and has a similar limitation. 4
The reserved rights doctrine underwent modification in 1976 with
the passage of the McCarran Amendment, which gave official congressional consent to include the United States as a party in state general
adjudications of water rights.3 5 At such adjudications, state water adjudicators can require the federal government to quantify any water
rights held under the reserved rights doctrine. It is significant to note
that Congress, although impliedly approving the reserved rights doctrine, has partially limited the doctrine by requiring federal agencies to
participate in state general adjudications-a procedural component of
state law. This congressional deference to state procedural systems is
also evident in the non-reserved rights doctrine.
C.

NON-RESERVED RIGHTS

The United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Rio Grande
Dam & Irrigation Co., identified two ways in which the federal government retains power over waters located on public lands: (1) to preserve
flows for navigation, and (2) to maintain continued flows for the beneficial use of the public lands.37 It was under this broad concept of "continued flows" for "beneficial use" that the Winters Court established the
31.
32.
States,
33.

Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963).
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700 (1978); Cappaert v. United
426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976).
New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 702 ("Where water is only valuable for a secondary use

of the reservation ...

there arises the ...

inference that Congress intended, consistent

with its other views, that the United States would acquire water in the same manner as
any other public or private appropriator."). The New Mexico holding narrowed the
reserved rights doctrine considerably. Proponents of state administration rejoiced:
"This was a substantial victory for the water users of the West. The enemy was not defeated but he was thrown back, and substantial territory feared lost was recaptured."
Trelease, supra note 6, at 759.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 118-25 (noting that in those instances where
Congress has not explicitly outlined a specific use, the non-reserved right should not
be invoked, and the federal government should instead seek to establish water rights
under existing state systems).
35. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2000).
36. See infra Part IV. (A).
37. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
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concept of the federal reserved right.3 The natural question arising
after Rio Grande and Winters is whether the reserved rights doctrine
constitutes the sole power of the federal government under this
broader concept of continued flows for beneficial use on public lands.
Commentators have argued that the reserved rights doctrine is not exclusive-the closely related non-reserved rights doctrine accompanies
it. The non-reserved rights doctrine is that the federal government can
"appropriate water on its own property for congressionally authorized
9
uses, whether or not such uses are part of any 'reservation' of land."0
Similar to a reserved right, such appropriation may be made outside
any requirements imposed by state law.
As an example of non-reserved rights, consider again the Fort
Belknap Indian Reservation discussed in the Winters case. Suppose
Congress passed a law implementing a new program on the Indian
reservation that was very water intensive and that constituted a water
use forbidden under Montana water law. The United States could not
invoke the reserved rights doctrine because no reservation of land has
been made. Further, the federal government could not appropriate
water under the state system because of the restrictions of state law.
This is where the non-reserved right becomes essential: the nonreserved rights doctrine permits the federal government to simply appropriate water to itself irrespective of state law and notwithstanding
the lack of a reservation of land, allowing the federal government to
fulfill the purposes of its statutorily created program.
D. REGULATORY RIGHTS

In addition to reserved rights (and arguably non-reserved rights),
the federal government possesses another power over water found on
public lands: the power to regulate water users. This power, based on
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, permits the federal government to "preempt state water laws in order to carry out federal purposes and programs."40 This regulatory right has its foundation in a
United States Supreme Court ruling from 1946, First Iowa Hydro-Electric
41
Cooperative v. FederalPower Commission. In First Iowa, the Court considered whether the Federal Power Commission could issue a dam construction permit to an applicant, even though the applicant would not
qualify for an Iowa state license.42 The Court held that the State could
not require state licensing of applicants if such licensing would frusWinters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
Krulitz Opinion, supra note 2, at 574; see also Federal "Nonreserved" Rights, in 4
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 37-120 (Robert E. Beck, ed., LexisNexis repl. vol. 2004).
40. Federal Regulatory Rights, in 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 37-119 (Robert E.
Beck, ed., LexisNexis repl. vol. 2004).
41. First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
42. See id. at 156-61.
38.
39.
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trate the intent of Congress to "make progress with the development of
the long idle water power resources of the Nation. ... ,A The Court further held that the Federal Power Act "leaves to the States their traditional jurisdiction subject to the admittedly superior right of the Federal Government." 44 Because denial of a state license would have
stopped the project and ultimately frustrated congressional intent, the
Court held that the Federal Power Act preempted the Iowa state licensing requirement.
It appears, initially, that regulatory rights and non-reserved rights
are the exact same thing. 5 After all, regulatory rights and non-reserved
rights both grant the federal government the power to implement federal projects irrespective of state substantive law. There is, however, an
important distinction between the two doctrines. Regulatory rights
apply to situations where there is a private third-party regulated by the
federal government.
The regulatory rights doctrine determines
whether federal or state regulations apply to a private party. Nonreserved rights on the other hand, only involve the federal government. The non-reserved rights doctrine is solely a question of whether
the federal government can, itself, appropriate water for a federal program. Although this article focuses almost exclusively on non-reserved
rights, it is worth noting that federal courts have upheld other doctrines (reserved rights and regulatory rights) as valid assertions of federal powers.
Now that the conceptual underpinnings of the non-reserved right
have been established, it is appropriate to address the legality of the
non-reserved right. As stated above, at its inception, the non-reserved
right was met with resistance and criticism. Opponents of the doctrine
questioned its constitutional and legal validity. A series of opinions
issued by various federal officials memorialize the debate surrounding
the doctrine's validity. What follows is a summary of the debate regarding the non-reserved rights doctrine from its inception in 1979 to its
disappearance in the early 1980s.

43.
44.
45.

Id. at 171.
Id.
One water law treatise notes the similarities:
Federal regulatory rights were first asserted as "nonreserved" rights in the
context of carrying out land management objectives established by federal
land management plans. Although these initial efforts might be classified as
"proprietary" rights, for purposes of convenience they are here classified as
federal regulatory rights, since they are required to carry out congressionallymandated policies and programs.
Federal Regulatory Rights, supra note 40, at 37-119.
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m. LEGAL/CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR NON-RESERVED
RIGHTS
In June, 1979, the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior, Leo
Krulitz, released a lengthy opinion discussing a wide variety of issues
related to water rights and federal lands.46 Part of the Krulitz Opinion
focused on the ways in which the federal government could obtain water rights to support the programs and goals set forth in the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act ("FLPMA") .47 It was under this r-ubric that Krulitz introduced the concept of the federal "non-reserved"
water right. The Krulitz Opinion sparked an immediate debate over
the role of state law in federal water appropriation. The concept of
federal non-reserved rights was so controversial that two additional
solicitors for the Department of the Interior issued separate opinions
on the topic in the space of three years. 48 The final word on the subject
came in the form of an opinion issued by the head of the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice, Theodore Olson. 9 After the
Olson Opinion, only a handful of legal commentators continued to
refer to the non-reserved right; federal agencies and federal officials
discontinued any reference to the non-reserved right-leaving many to
wonder whether the non-reserved right had been buried for good.
The following is a summary of the arguments made in the chain of
opinions drafted by federal officials.
A. KRULITZ OPINION

As stated, in 1979 Leo Krulitz, Solicitor for the Department of the
Interior, issued an opinion introducing the concept of the federal nonreserved water rightil Krulitz's Opinion encompassed much more
than non-reserved rights. Krulitz summarized the way in which the
largest agencies within the Department of the Interior were to handle
water issues. 5' Krulitz presented his opinion as being a "comprehensive
analysis" of both reserved rights and non-reserved rights.5
First, Krulitz outlined the legal concepts relating to water found on
public lands in the West. Krulitz argued that Congress has plenary
power under the Property Clause of the United States Constitution to
control the public lands and consequently the "disposition and use" of

46. Krulitz Opinion, supra note 2.
47. See id. at 615. Recall, FLPMA had been passed three years earlier.
48. See infra Parts III.B-C.
49. See Federal "Non-Reserved" Water Rights, 6 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 328
(1982) [hereinafter Olson Opinion].
50. Krulitz Opinion, supranote 2.
51. Id. at 562.
52. Id. Krulitz was correct to analyze the reserved right and the non-reserved right
together. See infra text accompanying note 104.
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the water thereon.53 States can only acquire an interest in property of
the United States, such as water found on the public lands, through an
express grant from Congress. 4 Further, "to the extent Congress has
not clearly granted authority to the states over [water on federal
lands], the Federal Government maintains its sovereign rights in such
waters and may put them to use irrespective of state law." 55 In addition
to the Property Clause, Krulitz pointed to the Supremacy Clause to
support the idea that the substantive aspects of state law do not bind
Congress and the Federal Government unless Congress submits to
such regulation.56
Second, Krulitz argued that Congress did not expressly grant states
power to administer the water rights of the federal government when
the federal government seeks to complete a federal program." To justify that argument, Krulitz identified and discounted the three Acts
traditionally cited to support the congressional grant of authority over
water to the states (Act of 1866, Act of 1870, and the Desert Land Act
of 1877).58 Krulitz argued that the acts in question only apply to private
party appropriations and not to federal government appropriations.
The Desert Lands Act "does not directly address federal rights to use
water for congressionally authorized purposes on the federal
lands. ... ,59 The Krulitz Opinion stated that "by these relatively narrow
Acts of 1866, 1870 and 1877, the United States did not divest itself of its
authority, as sovereign, to the unappropriatedwater on the public lands
for governmental purposes,"6° and that "neither the Desert Land Act
nor any other federal statute deals generally with how the United
States should acquire and maintain rights to use water on the public
domain .... ,61 The opinion concluded that "since the Federal Government has never granted away its right to make use of unappropriated waters on federal lands . . .the United States has retained its
power to vest in itself water rights in unappropriatedwaters and it may
exercise such power independent of substantive state law." 62 In support
of this proposition, Krulitz cited Cappaert v. United States, in which the
United States Supreme Court declared, "[f]ederal water rights are not
dependent upon state law or state procedures....,,r
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Krulitz Opinion, supra note 2, at 563.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 565-71.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 571.
Id. at 568, 576 (quoting Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 145 (1976)).
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Finally, after establishing that the federal government did not need
to comply with state substantive law when appropriating water on public lands, the Krulitz Opinion tackled the question of whether the federal government must comply with state procedural requirements.
Kurlitz stated his opinion that "while congressionally authorized programs may plainly be frustrated in certain states if the substance of
state law is binding on federal agencies, no equal danger is posed by
compliance with state procedures."'' The Krulitz Opinion did not address the question of whether the federal government can entirely
avoid state procedures because, according to the opinion, it is in the
best interest of all parties to follow state procedures. 65 For example,
"[i]t puts subsequent state appropriators on clear notice of federal
rights, reduces uncertainty, and allows better integration of state and
federal water rights."6
In summary, the Krulitz Opinion held that the Supremacy Clause
and Property Clause work together to give Congress full power over the
disposition and use of water on public lands. The only way Congress
could lose this power is by expressly granting it to other parties such as
the states. Congress granted power to the states to administer water
found on public lands, but only to the extent that this power pertained
to private parties. Congress had not expressly granted power to the
states to administer water on public lands when the federal government needed water for a federal program. Thus, the federal government retained the power to appropriate water on public lands as it desired and according to its own prerogatives. Further, the Krulitz Opinion controversially declared that federal agencies had the power under
FLPMA to assert non-reserved water rights. Because the federal government retained the inherent right to appropriate water for itself, it
could do so at any time and at any level, including at the agency level.
The Krulitz Opinion met with criticism. It became apparent that
the sticking point of the federal non-reserved right-and the sole purpose for needing a non-reserved right-were instream flows. The laws
of the western states concerning instream flows and ecological protection varied at the time.67 Some feared that the federal government,
able to assert their own instream flows, would disrupt state water programs:
All of the devices for reserving streams, establishing free flowing rivers, controlling appropriations, appropriating instream flows, setting
minimum flows-and even the lack of any of these-are choices made
by legislatures, officials, and agencies of the states. In each state these
64.

Id. at 577 (citation omitted).

65.
66.

Id.
Id. For a more detailed discussion about the advantages of adhering to state

procedural systems, see Part IV. (A). infra
67. See Trelease, supranote 6, at 771-72.

Issue I

FEDERAL NON-RESERVED RIGHTS

decisions, processes, and results represent a balance between public
and private interests, between the wealth-producing and the amenitypreserving pressures faced by local politician.
...
In large areas of the West there will be no opportunity to balance
interests, compare uses, choose between uses, or choose alternative
uses. The development of a particular state could be controlled not
by what legislators, officials, and agencies feel is good for the state,
but by what federal regional officials think is good for the public
lands within the state. Where the state has struck a balance it may be
upset.B
Advocates of state control over instream flows demanded that Congress
officially reject the non-reserved rights doctrine completely and permanently. It was against this foment and rally for state control that
Solicitor Clyde 0. Martz released the next in the series of opinions.
B. MARTZ SUPPLEMENT

In January 1981, less than two years after the Krulitz issued his
Opinion, a different solicitor to the Department of the Interior, Clyde
0. Martz, issued a supplement to the Krulitz Opinion.69 The Carter
Administration was in its final month in office at the time Solicitor
Martz issued the supplement. Solicitor Martz was, quite possibly, attempting to mollify opponents of the controversial non-reserved rights
doctrine. The incoming Reagan Administration seemed likely to overturn many of the Carter Administration's policies, particularly in the
realm of public lands. The Martz Supplement may have been an attempt to fashion the non-reserved rights doctrine in a way as to preserve its existence-leaving it available as a tool for regional public
land managers. The Martz Supplement was short and concise and
primarily amended conceptual weaknesses of the Krulitz Opinion.
Martz began by identifying four ways in which the federal government could acquire water rights: (1) through the reserved rights doctrine, where the federal government impliedly reserves water when it
reserves a tract of land; (2) through historic consumptive use; (3)
through acquisition of water "expressly or impliedly mandated by [an]
Act of Congress"; or (4) through "purchase, exchange, condemnation
or gift."7°
Martz focused on the third component of the list-acquisition of
water expressly or impliedly mandated by Congress-the non-reserved
right. The Martz Supplement stated: "Federal agencies should, as a
68. Id. at 773.
69. Supplement to Solicitor Opinion No. M-36914, On Federal Water Rights of the
National Park Service, Fish & Wildlife Service, Bureau of Reclamation and the Bureau
of Land Management, 88 Interior Dec. 253 (1981) [hereinafter Martz Supplement].
70. Id. at 255.
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matter of policy, acquire water rights in accordance with the substantive and procedural provisions of state law." 7' However, Martz identified two exceptions to the policy. First, the Federal government does
not need to conform to state procedural law to assert a fight over water
which federal agencies traditionally consumed and met the state definition of "beneficial use., 7'

This provision spoke to non-compliance

with state procedural laws, including statutorily required registration of
all water rights with the appropriate state body. Martz contended that
the federal government retained rights to water used for a number of
years, despite the fact that the federal government had not conformed
to state registration requirements.73
Second, the Martz Supplement held that the Federal government
does not need to conform to state substantive water law when "clearly
mandated by an Act of Congress" under the federal supremacy power. 74
Martz justified the two exceptions for the same reasons outlined by
Solicitor Krulitz. Martz maintained that the Property Clause and Supremacy Clause of the Constitution gave Congress the full power to
dictate the management and disposition of waters located on public
lands.75 Similarly, the Martz Supplement asserted that no act of Congress had ever relinquished the congressional power to "exercise future dominion over unappropriated water on public land" when such
was needed to facilitate a federal program. 76
Most importantly, the Martz Supplement declared that the FLPMA
was not a congressional mandate for agencies to appropriate water outside of state substantive water law.77 "FLPMA does not authorize or
otherwise mandate the Department [of the Interior] to appropriate or
otherwise utilize water outside state recognized beneficial use concepts
for the broad general purposes outlined as management objectives in
the Act., 78 Thus, the main reason for creating the non-reserved rightto provide water for federal programs under FLPMA- was outside of
the scope of the non-reserved rights doctrine. By arguing that the nonreserved right could not be invoked under FLPMA, Martz may have
been trying to calm the tide of opposition that was being raised against
the non-reserved rights doctrine. In any event, the Martz Supplement
reinforced the strongest arguments of the Krulitz Opinion and discounted its more controversial aspects.

71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 256.

75.

Id.

76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id. at 257.
Id.
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Solicitor Martz, an official in the Carter Administration, appears to
have tried to resolve the debate over non-reserved rights before President Carter left office. Martz released the Supplement on January 16,
1981, days before the newly-elected Reagan Administration entered the
White House. 9 If Martz hoped that issuing the Supplement would save
the doctrine of non-reserved rights, the new Solicitor to the Department of the Interior, William H. Coldiron, quickly dashed those
hopes. 0
On September 11, 1981, Coldiron released a Solicitor's Opinion in
complete opposition to the conclusions reached by Krulitz and Martz."'
Coldiron began his opinion by summarizing the arguments advanced
by Krulitz and Martz and acknowledging that the concept of the nonreserved right was the subject of "continuing debate and controversy. " 8
Coldiron also declared that non-reserved rights had "created a new
and unnecessary cloud of ambiguity over private water rights dependent on8 3water sources that are on, under, over or appurtenant to federal
lands.
Like Krulitz and Martz, Coldiron acknowledged that the combination of the Property Clause, Commerce Clause, and the Supremacy
Clause gave Congress full power over the management and disposition
of water found on public lands. 4 Coldiron further acknowledged that
"it is unlikely that state law could preclude reasonable water use by a
federal agency if Congress specifies a particular federal use. 88 Coldiron, however, argued that Congress had granted "exclusive sovereignty"
over water to the states; the water was "severed" from public lands by

79. Id. at 253.
80. Nonreserved Water Rights-United States Compliance with State Law, 88 Interior Dec. 1055 (1981) [hereinafter Coldiron Opinion]. As expected, the declaration
in FLPMA that the public lands were retained by the federal government and managed
in a way to protect among other things, the ecological value of the land, did not sit well
with many Westerners. In the early 1980s, dissatisfaction of individuals in the West
with policies of federal land managers led to what has been termed the "Sagebrush
Rebellion." The Sagebrush Rebels (western congressmen) led a movement to have
Congress repeal FLPMA and endorse state control of public lands, particularly grazing.
"The Sagebrush Rebels, though unable to convince Congress to sell off the federal
lands, had little trouble achieving a less radical objective: persuading the Interior Department of the 1980s that it ought to take a hands-off policy toward grazing."
WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 99. Although the Sagebrush Rebellion centered on grazing, it is easy to see how the Reagan Administration came to embrace the attitude of
hands-off federal management with regards to water found on public lands.
81. See Coldiron Opinion, supra note 80.
82. Id. at 1056-57
83. Id.

84.

Id. at 1057-58.

85.

Id.at 1058.
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the Desert Lands Act of 1877.86 Congress had not retained any power
over water on federal lands.
In fact, Coldiron noted that at least
thirty-seven statutes regarding western water had expressly or implicitly
deferred to state water law for administration of water found on public
lands. Thus, "there is neither a congressional nor judicial basis for
the exercise of a federal non-reserved water right."89 Coldiron maintained that in order for the United States to regain control over water
on the public lands, Congress would have to amend or repeal the 1866,
1870, and 1877 Acts. ° "If Congress wishes to abandon its historical
practice of deference it must explicitly exercise its power.""
The weakness of the Coldiron Opinion is clear-it did not make
any new arguments. The Opinion flatly denied the existence of a nonreserved right, but at the same time acknowledged that Congress has
full power to use water found on public lands-the very foundation of
the non-reserved rights doctrine." Coldiron even described the process that Congress must follow to gain water rights irrespective of state
substantive law. 93 It is difficult to understand how Coldiron did not
conclude that this constitutes a non-reserved right.
Similar concepts underlie both the Martz Supplement and the
Coldiron Opinion, yet, the Coldiron Opinion declared that the nonreserved right does not exist.94 The difference, however subtle, lies in

the identification of the current holder of the power. Martz concluded
that the federal government retains the power to appropriate water on
public lands outside of state water systems, and must simply be explicit
when doing so. 9 Thus, Martz argued that the power remained with the
federal government despite Acts delegating some control of water to
the states. Coldiron, on the other hand, indicated that Congress has
delegated all power to administer water on the public lands to the
states.9 Under this approach, if the federal government wishes to appropriate water outside of the state water systems, Congress must first
explicitly take back the power of administrationY

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 1059-60.
See id. at 1060.
Id.
Id. at 1062.
Id. at 1063.
Id. at 1064.
Id.
Id. at 1063-64.
Id. at 1064.

95.

See Martz Supplement, supra note 69, at 257 (opining that FLPMA did not ex-

plicitly authorize appropriation outside of the substantive requirements of state law).
96.

Coldiron Opinion, supra note 80, at 1059-60.

97.

Id. at 1063-64.
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Once Solicitor Coldiron spoke on the matter, employees of the
Department of the Interior stopped pursuing any non-reserved rights.
However, some regional officers of the National Forest Service, an
agency within the Department of Agriculture, attempted to assert
rights under the non-reserved doctrine. The Department of the Agriculture asked the Department of Justice to weigh in on the nonreserved right question.9 As a result, Assistant Attorney General in the
Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice, Theodore B. Olson, issued an opinion on June 16, 1982.'0° The Olson Opinion stands
as the strongest legal authority on the matter and, fittingly, as the last
official word on the non-reserved right.
Much like the other commentators, Olson immediately got to the
Constitutional heart of the matter. Olson identified the Property
Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the Supremacy Clause as the foundation for both the reserved right and the non-reserved right. 0 ' "It is
important to understand that any water rights that may be asserted by
the federal government outside of state law-whether called reserved,
non-reserved, or by some other name-rest on this same constitutional
basis.' ' 0 2 This is one of Olson's most important points, and one that is

essential to understanding the non-reserved right. Non-reserved rights
and reserved rights go hand in hand because both are an appropriations of water outside of state substantive law-non-reserved rights do
not comply to state in-stream flow laws, while reserved rights do not
comply with the state requirement that water be put to beneficial use
in a reasonable time. One doctrine cannot exist without the other,
03
because both are founded on the same Constitutional principles.
Olson established that Congress does have the power to administer water found on public lands, and then proceeded to address
whether
0 4
Congress granted some or all of this power to the states.
First, Olson dispelled the misconception that the debate is over
"ownership" of the water.'05 Defining the debate in terms of the actual
ownership of water leads to confusing and conflicting results. "[I]f
Congress, either by statehood acts or land management statutes, gave
98. Olson Opinion, supra note 49, at 329.
99. Id. at 329-30.
100. Id. at 329.
101. Id. at 362-63.
102. Id.
103. See generally id. at 330-31.
104. Id. at 362.
105. Id. at 366-67. In his criticism of the Krulitz Opinion, Trelease also discounted
the notion of federal ownership of natural waters: "I do not believe anyone owns the
water in the ocean, in a cloud, in the raindrops, or in a stream. It is res nullis, the
property of no one, a concept that has been with us since Roman times." Trelease,
supranote 6, at 763.
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the states ownership of all unappropriated waters on the public domain, on what basis can the federal government reserve some of that
water for a federal use, without compensation, by a withdrawal of land
made after ownership of the waters passed to the states?" 10 6 Olson declared that "[u] nappropriated water, much as wild animals, has been
viewed as res nullius-the property of no one-until it has been captured.",1 7 Thus, neither the state nor the federal government "owns"
the unappropriated water. "The important question is whether state or
federal rules of capture apply to the United States."'0 8
Second, Olson turned to the three crucial acts introduced at the
beginning of this article- the Acts of 1866, 1870, and 1877-to determine whether any of the powers of the federal government have
been passed to the states.'9 Olson analyzed the history and the language of the acts in conjunction with Supreme Court decisions and
concluded, "the Acts gave the states authority only to control and administer private rights to water on federally owned lands, and did not
grant away the federal government's power.., to use unappropriated
water on federal lands without regard to state law.""" Olson rejected
the idea that Congress partially repealed the Acts by implication every
time it reserves an area of federal land, stating that Congress simply
preempts inconsistent state control over the federal uses."'
Once Olson established that Congress does have the power to make
non-reserved water appropriations, he turned to the only issue remaining-how Congress should go about making such an appropriation.
Olson traced the history of congressional deference to state water law,
identifying the Acts of 1866 and 1870, the Desert Land Act of 1877, the
Reclamation Act of 1902, and the McCarran 2Amendment as representative of federal deference to state water law."
The effect of Congress' deference to state water law can best be understood as establishing a 'presumption' to be read into the language
and legislative history of federal statutes that authorize the management of federal lands-ise., that in the absence of evidence to the con-

106. Olson Opinion, supranote 49, at 365.
107. Id. at 366.
108. Id. at 367 (quoting Comment, FederalNonreserved Water Rights, 48 U. CHI. L. REv.
758, 772 (1981)).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 367-70. Olson identified two cases specifically-California Oregon Power
Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 349 U.S. 345 (1955), and Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 142(1935). See supra text accompanying notes 17-20 (discussing CaliforniaOregon Power Co..).
111. Id. at 370 (noting that implied repeals of federal statutes are "highly disfavored").
112. Id. at 377.
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intend to alter or aftrary, it will be presumed that Congress did11not
3
fect its policy of deference to state water law.
Olson argued the existence of a presumption that the federal government will comply with state substantive law unless there is convincing
evidence, such as explicit statutory language, that dictates otherwise." 4
Olson analogized the entire situation to a then-recent United
States Supreme Court decision.1 1 5 In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,
the Court "refused to fashion specific federal rules governing the relative priority of private liens" and instead chose to defer to state law on
the matter.1 6 Essentially, the Court held that, in some instances, federal law defers to state law on certain matters.1 7 The Court discussed
factors relevant in determining whether deference to state law would
be appropriate:
Undoubtedly, federal programs that "by their very nature are and
must be uniform in character throughout the Nation" necessitate
formulation of controlling federal rules. Conversely, when there is little need for a nationally uniform body of law, state law may be incorporated as the federal rule of decision. Apart from considerations of
uniformity, we must also determine whether application of state law
would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs. If so, we
must fashion special rules solicitous of those federal interests. Finally,
our choice-of-law inquiry must consider the extent to which application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law. 18
These factors appear to be met in the case of water rights and water
law. State water laws have governed huge federal programs, including
all projects under the Reclamation Act, Further, the federal government has played an almost insignificant role in water appropriation.
Finally, many existing appropriators fear that non-reserved rights will
lead to instability and insecurity of existing state water systems. Thus,
because typical water appropriations meet many of the Kimbell factors,
deference to state law prevails. Olson concluded that if Congress
wished to exercise its power to appropriate water irrespective of state

113. Id.
114. See id. at 377-78.
115. Id. at 378 (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979)).
116. Id. (citing Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 740).
117. See Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 740.
118. Id. at 728-29 (citations omitted). In summary, the Court considered the following factors relevant to the state law deference question: (1) the extent to which federal
programs can be or have been adapted to state law; (2) the role of the federal government in the regulated field; (3) the significance of the federal interests at stake; (4) the
risk to federal goals and interests posed by application of state law; and (5) the extent
to which application of federal rules will disrupt private expectations.
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law, that power "must be clearly and specifically exercised, either expressly or by necessary implication."' 9
IV. ADVANTAGES OF THE NON-RESERVED RIGHT
The Olson Opinion is well-reasoned and likely the most correct of
all of the opinions described above. While Olson did a fine job addressing the legality of the non-reserved rights doctrine, there are additional non-legal justifications for acknowledging and using federal
non-reserved rights. First, even though the federal government would
not adhere to state substantive water law, it would adhere to the state
procedural laws, meaning that the laws of the various states would fully
protect senior water rights holders. Second, application of nonreserved rights may lead to less reliance by the federal government on
the reserved rights doctrine. This will avoid the many problems associated with the reserved rights doctrine. 2 0 Finally, the non-reserved right
may alleviate many of the problems associated with state-run instream
flow programs. States will have an incentive to develop and improve
their own instream flow programs.
A. STATE PROCEDURAL LAW

The chain of opinions described above only dealt tangentially with
the question of whether the federal government should comply with
state procedural law. The opinions gave little attention to this point,
probably because it was not very controversial. All of the opinionwriters agreed that the federal government should adhere to state procedural law in all circumstances. One could easily argue that, if the
federal government has the constitutional power to ignore state substantive law, the power must also extend to permit avoidance of state
procedural law. However, this argument is largely moot because of the
overwhelming advantages to following state procedural laws. Solicitor
Krulitz briefly addressed this subject: "I am unable to say that [compliance with state procedural law] is required as a matter of law, but because it may be required, the safer course is to follow state procedures
in perfecting non-reserved water rights."' 21 Krulitz also noted the ad119.

Olson Opinion, supra note 49, at 383.

REPORT NWC-L-71-014, LEGAL
117-33 (1971)
(noting the problems of the reserved rights doctrine to include uncertainty as to the
quantity reserved and uncertainty as to the time such rights will actually be asserted).
Trelease argued that the uncertainty has hurt the economy of areas located near large
federal reservations of land, such as Indian reservations or national forests, because
investors are scared of the future impacts of the reserved rights. See id. at 129 (noting
that "even federal agencies are unwilling to invest in projects whose water rights are
jeopardized by the federal reserved water rights doctrine").
121. Krulitz Opinion, supranote 2, at 577-78.
120.

See

FRANK J. TRELEASE, NAT'L WATER COMM'N,

STUDY NO. 5, FINAL REPORT: FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAw
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vantages of doing so: "Complying with state procedural law has certain
advantages. It puts subsequent state appropriators on clear notice of
federal rights, reduces uncertainty,
and allows better integration of
' 22
state and federal water rights.'

It is apparent that, even if the federal government invokes nonreserved rights, it must develop those rights under state procedural
systems. This allows for complete protection of all private water appropriators. State governments will register, quantify, and assign priority dates to federal water rights asserted under the non-reserved rights
doctrine. In times of shortage, anyone holding a water right senior in
priority to the non-reserved right would be able to demand water from
the right. Of course, such a demand makes little sense in the context
of instream flows,

123

but it is still important to note that the priority of a

holder's water right protects all current water rights holders in state
systems.
It is also reasonable to argue that the existence of a non-reserved
right might actually benefit downstream juniors. Assume, for example,
that the federal government purchases a senior water right and converts it to an instream flow. The instream flow would not injury any
junior users to the non-reserved right because the federal government
would be limited to the amount of water the old senior user was actually "consuming."24 Upstream juniors would have little to complain
about-the old senior appropriator could have demanded water from
them at anytime anyway. It makes no difference that the water the
federal government will use its senior water right for an instream flow
instead of for irrigation. Further, the instream flow would open up the
downstream river for new appropriations. Because the instream flow is
non-consumptive, after it leaves the instream flow boundaries, the water would be free for downstream appropriation. In an era when unappropriated water is difficult to find, instream flows may be a means
of creating new water rights.

122. Id. at 577. The language of the Great Sand Dunes National Park and Preserve
Act, discussed below, shows that Congress continues to harbor the same intention
regarding adherence to state procedural law. The Act states, "[W]ater rights shall be
appropriated, adjudicated, changed, and administered pursuant to the procedural
requirements and priority system of the laws of the State of Colorado." Great Sand
Dunes National Park and Preserve Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-530, § 9(b) (2) (A), 114
Stat. 2527, 2533 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 410hhh-7 (b) (2) (A) (2000)).
123. Instream flows are non-consumptive, meaning that they do not actually use the
water. Thus, a person holding a downstream water right, even a right senior to the
non-reserved right, would never have to demand water from the non-reserved right.
The non-reserved right is already delivering all of the water it gets to all downstream
users.
124. See generally JAMES N. CORBRIDGE, JR. & TERESA A. RICE, VRANESH'S COLORADO
WATER LAW 246 (rev. ed., University Press of Colorado 1999).
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B. CERTAINTY/ QUANTIFICATION
Another advantage of the non-reserved rights doctrine is that it has
the capability of completely replacing the reserved rights doctrine.
Commentators have long criticized the reserved rights doctrine."' Reserved water rights have priority dates correlating to the date of the
reservation of land regardless of the actual date of appropriation.
Some of these unexercised priorities date back to the 1800s.126 Further,
there is no requirement that the federal government quantify reserved
rights at their creation.12 7 Thus, private water rights holders have dealt
with much uncertainty. If Congress recognizes and uses non-reserved
rights, it may avoid the problems of the reserved rights. Instead of
leaving water rights to the mysterious realm of the reserved right, Congress, through express statutory provisions, can simply require government agencies to appropriate necessary water under the nonreserved rights doctrine. This would allow state procedural systems to
quantify federal water rights and grant them a priority date according
to when the federal government actually put the water to use.
C. IMPROVEMENT OF INSTREAM FLOW SYSTEMS
The federal government's assertion of non-reserved rights may result in vast changes in state substantive laws. One possibility is that
states will change their laws to allow the federal government to hold
instream water rights, thus alleviating most of the friction regarding
non-reserved rights. The more plausible outcome is that state agencies
charged with appropriating instream flows will take a more proactive
approach to instream flows. Many state water conservation boards currently take a minimalist approach to instream flows. If federal agencies
assert non-reserved water rights, state conservation boards may feel
pressured to make larger instream appropriations. After all, if the
states do an adequate job maintaining instream flows, the federal government will have no reason to assert a non-reserved right. By appropriating sufficient instream flows first, the states would essentially
eliminate the need for federal non-reserved rights and would retain
125. TRELEASE, supra note 120, at 130-31 (noting that, following the PeltonDam decision, "western Senators and Congressmen reacted to the fears of their constituents by
seeking legislative reversal of the reservation doctrine. Every Congress since 1956 has
seen the introduction of bills directed to that end").
126. See TRELEASE, supra note 120, at 125-26 (quoting CharlesJ. Meyers, Robert Emmet
Clark's Water and Water Rights-A Treatise on the Law of Waters and Allied Problems, 77 YALE
L.J. 1036, 1042 n.15 (1968) (book review)).
127. See id. at 124 (noting that the federal government's ability to reserve water

rights without quantification creates a problem for state officials "charged with the
administration of streams [that] have no records of [water rights'] existence, location,
amount and priority... .Water users may not know of the existence of upstream uses,

hence have no way of testing or determining their entitlement with legal certainty.").
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power over the water. Thus, the federal government's assertion of
non-reserved rights only stands to improve state instream flow systems.
V. APPLICATION OF NON-RESERVED RIGHTS
Following the Olson Opinion, federal officials remained silent on
the issue of the non-reserved right. The question that naturally arises
is whether the federal government, in spite of the silence of the last
twenty years, has ever asserted a non-reserved right under the parameters laid out in the Olson Opinion. According to the Olson Opinion,
before a federal agency can assert a non-reserved water right, Congress
must explicitly direct the agency, through statute, to do so. 28
Aside from the Great Sand Dunes National Park and Preserve Act
("GSDA") ,9 there do not appear to be any examples of a non-reserved
water right. A number of factors may play into the federal government's hesitancy to assert non-reserved rights. Because neither the
United States Supreme Court or a federal court of appeals ever settled
this issue, federal agencies can only rely on the Olson Opinion as
granting authority to act. This may not provide sufficient protection
for agency actors. Further, after the uproar surrounding the inception
of the non-reserved right, federal agencies may believe that it is better
to avoid the non-reserved right and the almost-certain litigation that
would accompany assertion of such rights.
In spite of the hesitancy of federal agencies, the tide may be turning. One recent enactment appears to invoke non-reserved rights.
The GSDA, signed into law in 2000, upgraded the status of the Great
Sand Dunes National Monument and added additional land to protect
the fragile ecosystem of the sand dunes. 30 Some scholars argue that
the GSDA represents the first official congressional application of the
non-reserved right.13 ' Before analyzing the language of the statute in
depth, it is important to examine the importance of water to the region.
The Great Sand Dunes are located just outside of the town of Alamosa in southern Colorado. Situated in an area surrounded by various
mountain ranges in the Rocky Mountain chain, the sand dunes are a
striking and unexpected geologic feature. Water is essential to maintaining the existence of the sand dunes. The website created by the
National Park Service to educate the public about the natural aspects
of the Park and Preserve describes the unique hydrology of the region:
128. See Olson Opinion, supra note 49, at 362.
129. 16 U.S.C. § 410hhh (2000).
130. Nat'l Park Serv., Great Sand Dunes National Park and Preserve - Frequently
Asked Questions, http://www.nps.gov/grsa/faqs.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2006). The
Great Sand Dunes National Monument was created in 1932 by President Herbert Hoover. Id.
131. See Leshy, supranote 2, at 288.
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Without water, the dunes and the incredible diversity of life in and
around them would become the "Not-So-Great-Sand-Dunes": creeks
would no longer flow across the sand, the dunes and the sand deposit
around them would change, and wetlands and ponds that support life
132
would dry up.
What makes the Great Sand Dunes even more complex is the increasing water demand of the surrounding communities, like Alamosa.
The National Park Service recognized the increasing water usage taking place just outside of the park and speculated that such usage affects
the water tables inside Park boundaries:
It is possible that the water table has already dropped significantly
from historic and current use.... While some research indicates that
at least part of the cause may be a natural geological change or related to cyclical precipitation patterns, historical evidence suggests
significant alteration of the entire regional water system by human
use over the past century may be a contributing reason. By 1938, an
estimated 10,000 artesian wells had been drilled into the regional aquifer. Many San Luis Valley streams and rivers have been extensively
diverted for irrigation both toward and away from the dunes area.'"
Because of the unique hydrologic nature of the Great Sand Dunes
National Park and Preserve and the increasing demands on water resources in the region, the language Congress used to create the park
contained a number of references to water. The language of Section 9
of the GSDA is of particular importance:
(2) Water Rights for National Park and National Preserve. In carrying
out this subchapter, the Secretary shall obtain and exercise any water
rights required to fulfill the purposes of the national park and the national preserve in accordance with the following provisions:
(A) Such water rights shall be appropriated, adjudicated, changed,
and administered pursuant to the procedural requirements and priority system of the laws of the State of Colorado.
(B) The purposes and other substantive characteristics of such water
rights shall be established pursuant to State law, except that the Secretary is specifically authorized to appropriate water under this subchapter exclusively for the purpose of maintaining ground water levels, surface water levels, and stream flows on, across, and under the
national park and national preserve, in order to accomplish the pur-

132. Nat'l Park Serv., Great Sand Dunes National Park and Preserve, Mysterious
Waters of the Dunes, http://www.nps.gov/archive/grsa/resources/mysterious
waters.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
133. Id.
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poses of the national park and the national preserve and to protect
park resources and park uses.14

It is easy to see how the language of the GSDA is an assertion of a
non-reserved water right. The GSDA clearly states that the Secretary
may appropriate water to preserve "stream flows."" 5 As noted above,
Colorado law only allows the Colorado Water Conservation Board to
hold instream flow rights. 3 6 Because the Congress granted the Secretary the authority to establish a water right to an instream flow-in
clear contradiction to state substantive water law-the Act must have
authorized an assertion of a non-reserved water right.
Some may argue that the GSDA was nothing more than an invocation of the "reserved" rights doctrine because the Act's water rights
were declared in conjunction with a reservation of land. However, the
GSDA specifically denies any federal reserved rights associated with the
creation of the National Park. 37 The United States Supreme Court
made it clear in United States v. New Mexico that Congress must be sufficiently explicit regarding the purposes of the reservation to establish a
reserved right.'3" Therefore, when Congress wishes to reserve tracts of
land, it must take great care in noting the contemporaneous reservation or denial of water rights. It seems that Congress was seeking that
same clarity of purpose by implementing the "no reserved rights" provision of the GSDA.
Even if the GSDA does authorize a non-reserved right, the nonreserved right does not officially exist until the Secretary of the Interior
acts under the statutory language and asserts a water right outside of
Colorado substantive law. In December, 2004, the National Park Service ("NPS") asserted an absolute right to all unappropriated groundwater underlying the Great Sand Dunes pursuant to Section 9 of the
GSDA. 139 Although the Park encompasses most of the hydrologic watershed, the Department of the Interior is seeking to assert rights un-

134. 16 U.S.C. § 41Ohhh-7(b) (2) (2000).
135. Id. § 410hhh-7(b)(2)(B).
136. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2006) (stating that the "Colorado water conservation board hereby vested with the exclusive authority" to appropriate instream
flows) (emphasis added).
137. § 410hhh-7(b) (2) (D) ("[N]o Federal reservation of water may be claimed or
established for the national park or the national preserve."). This provision comports
to the earlier argument that the federal non-reserved right has the ability to completely
replace the federal reserved right. If the GSDA authorized non-reserved rights, it is
very significant that the GSDA concurrently denied all federal reserved rights associated with the National Park.
138. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700-02 (1978).
139. In re Application for Approval of Absolute Ground Water Right in Alamosa &
Saguache Counties, No. 2004CW35 (Colo. Water Court Div. 3, filedJan. 7, 2005).
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der the Act for all such groundwater. 40 Following submittal of the federal government's application for all unappropriated groundwater
rights, at least thirteen parties filed objections.14 ' The NPS's application is still pending before the Colorado Water Court for Water Division Three. It remains to be seen if the non-reserved rights claimed
under GDSA will survive challenges by opposing parties. Thus, at this
juncture, the GSDA remains important, if for no other reason than for
setting a precedent for Congress to follow when drafting future statutes
dealing with the administration of water on public lands.
VI. FUTURE OF THE NON-RESERVED RIGHT
After analyzing the legal and social controversies surrounding the
federal non-reserved water right, one can only speculate as to its future
use. Two possible futures exist for the non-reserved rights doctrine. In
one, the federal government will view the GSDA as a mere drafting
anomaly that was never supposed to result in an actual assertion of
non-reserved rights, in which case the doctrine will become an academic gem, but will serve no real purpose. In the alternative, the nonreserved right will not only become a viable means of asserting federal
water rights on public lands, but it will also become the primary means
of asserting federal water rights. The latter seems to be the likelier
possibility.
It is undisputed that water resources in the western states are becoming more scarce and at the same time more valuable. Because
much of the land owned by the federal government also lies in the
western states, it seems inevitable that the federal government and the
states will remain in conflict over water use. As long as the federal government continues to retain and manage federal lands, it will inevitably need water to meet conservation management goals.4 2 Because
federal conservation programs will often fall outside of the permissible
bounds of state water law, the federal government will find the nonreserved right as its sole means of obtaining water.
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Id. The NPS does not, however, claim any quantifiable amount of groundwater

because it seeks only to "maintain, as nearly as possible, natural water levels and flows.
In consequence, no volumetric measurement is necessary as the claim will encompass
whatever previously unappropriated water is present at any given time." Id.
141. U.S. Dep't of Interior, Nat'l Park Serv., Nature & Science, Water: 2005 Current
Issues, Great Sand Dunes National Park & Preserve, http://www.nature.nps.gov/water/Current Issues/archived2005.cfm (Mar. 2005).
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The federal public land management policy under FLPMA altered federal pub-

lic lands management is to retain possession of the lands and manage them "in a man-

ner that will protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values...." 43 U.S.C. §
1701 (a) (8) (2000).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The non-reserved rights doctrine has been a substantial source of
debate and controversy. Many believe that the non-reserved right lacks
adequate foundation in law. A close analysis of the Olson Opinion,
however, shows that the non-reserved right is strongly rooted in law,
and is likely a valid exercise of federal power under the Constitution.
Not only is the non-reserved right constitutionally and legally
grounded, it is also logically grounded. The assertion of non-reserved
rights affords a number of benefits to both the federal government and
private water appropriators. As the federal government begins to assert non-reserved rights, these benefits will become more evident. The
GDSA appears to be the first authorization of non-reserved rights. It
marks the beginning of what may become the primary means of obtaining water for federal conservation projects. The non-reserved right
has returned, and this time it may be for good.

